States cut their pension contributions eight times more than other spending in response to fiscal stress. The cumulative impact of state undercontributions due to unexpected deficits over the last two decades explains about six percent of the total level of mid-2008 actuarial underfunding.
Introduction
Although federal laws regulate private pensions, imposing specific funding requirements to ensure eventual payment of promised benefits, state and local government pensions are not subject to these requirements. This lack of strict pension oversight means state legislatures can undercontribute to their pension plans. This may be of particular concern when state governments face fiscal stress, as undercontributing can help governments mitigate politically unpopular spending cuts or tax increases. Using the fraction of actuarially required contributions made by state governments, I show that fiscal stress caused states to cut their pension contributions eight times more than other spending. (Brown and Wilcox, 2009 ).
State-administered pensions receive funds from four sources. In fiscal year 2007, state governments, local governments, and employees each contributed about $30 billion, and while quite volatile, investment returns averaged about $100 billion annually over the last decade. Figure 1 shows historical trends of contributions from these sources. Despite these large inflows, state pension assets have not kept up with growing liabilities. Many states contribute the actuarially recommended amount to their pensions, but state governments tend to undercontribute to their pensions more when they face fiscal stress. For example, following the 1992 fiscal crisis, California delayed annual contributions of about $500 million to its Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) for more than a year. A lawsuit was filed and a superior court judge ordered the state to make the delayed contribution with accrued interest.
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996) Paul Chaney et al. (2002) find that when fiscally stressed, states with balanced budget requirements both undercontribute to their pensions and choose discount rates that obscure actuarial underfunding. Their results also suggest that undercontributions due to fiscal stress are not fully restored in other years, a result confirmed in this study. Olivia Mitchell and Robert Smith (1994) estimate that fiscal stress in the late 1980s, proxied by above average unemployment, led to lower state pension contributions. Fred Giertz and Leslie Papke (2007) find evidence that tax revenues influence funding status. Table 3 , where annual undercontributions were estimated with weighted ARCs and state contributions (U.S. Census). ARCs for 1993 , 1995 , 1997 , and 1999 were interpolated, and ARCs for 1989 -1991 were set to the 1992/94/96 average. These are likely overestimates, as a fraction of these undercontributions represent amortization of previous undercontributions, causing some double-counting. 3 Instead of smoothing out returns over the long-run, temporary pension surpluses may be dispersed to public employees through reduced employee contributions or increased benefits (Peskin, 2001; Bader & Gold, 2007) . 4 Elizabeth Cove Delisle (2010, p. 5) writes that "many states cover some local employees under their pension plans and restrict the extent to which local governments can reduce their contributions to the plans when revenues fall." Chaney et al. (2002, p. 290) suggest that state governments' ability to ignore statutory constraints suggests that "statutorily determined contribution rates limit the discretion of local, but not state, governments." undercontributions seem like the more appropriate focus for the state-sponsored plans considered in this study. In the short-run, however, some underfunding may be explained by local government contributions that do not cover increasing local pension liabilities. Underfunding can also be addressed by raising employee or required government contributions.
States recently increasing employee contributions include Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, 5 Underfunding at the beginning of this analysis in 1989 may also explain some the mid-2008 underfunding, but the amortization portion of the actuarially required contributions should account for most of this initial period underfunding. 6 Perhaps an even more striking proposal to reduce liabilities by Maria Fitzpatrick (2010) is that governments offer to buy back promised pension benefits for less than their expected present cost. As "the majority of Illinois public school teachers are willing to pay just 17 cents for a dollar increase in the present value of expected retirement benefits" (p. 2), this proposal could be Pareto-improving in some cases.
Mississippi, Vermont, and Wyoming (Poulson, 2011) . States would increase their actuarially required contributions if the amortization period for unfunded liabilities is decreased. For example, amortizing over the average remaining years of employee service, as required by the corporate accounting board, could cut the amortization period in half and double this part of states' required contributions (Miller, 2010) . In multiple-employer systems, states may also require local governments to increase their contributions.
Required state contributions could also rise dramatically if pensions lower their discount rates. Munnell et al. (2010a) show that lowering the discount rate from 8 to 5 percent would more than double the average required contributions of state-administered pensions-from 5 to 9 percent of state and local budgets. In a statement of preliminary views, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) discusses a partial decrease of discount rates: "Benefit payments that are expected to occur beyond the point at which expected plan assets are projected to be exhausted would be discounted…using a high-quality municipal bond index rate." (2010, p. 5)
As many states have not paid their full required contributions, discount rate reform could be reinforced by binding state governments to a minimum contribution ratio. Although it did not address discount rates or get placed on the ballot, the 2010 New Jersey Pension Fund Amendment would have constitutionally mandated the state government to pay the entire actuarially required contribution after a seven year phase-in.
Pension Funding and Contribution Ratios
In a defined benefit plan, actuaries calculate the assets needed to pay for promised benefits based on assumptions of fund investment returns, benefit levels, and employee characteristics. The state government's annual actuarially required contribution (ARC) includes new liabilities and an installment to amortize any underfunding, usually over 30 years. The contribution ratio divides actual contributions by the ARC. 7 Undercontributions occur when pension contributions are less than the ARC, that is, the contribution ratio is less than 100 percent.
All 50 states have laws regarding fiduciary standards for state pensions and these provisions are similar to the requirements of private sector pensions in about half of states. According to the United States General Accounting Office (1996, pp. 3-4):
7 A possible issue with using ARCs is that they can be adjusted by manipulating assumptions (Chaney et al., 2002; and Giertz and Papke, 2007) .
"…annual contributions to 56 percent of state and local pension plans are required to be actuarially based; for 40 percent of these plans, statutes set a specific contribution level, which in most cases is periodically adjusted to achieve actuarial balance, according to a state pension official."
States with contributions constrained by statute, e.g., a fixed percent of tax receipts, may undercontribute both because of a persistently low statutory rate or declines in tax revenue.
While some unconstrained states consistently pay their full required contributions, 8 other unconstrained states use this flexibility to undercontribute in years of fiscal stress.
Considering these unconstrained plans, Alicia Munnell et al. (2008) find that pension sponsors are more likely to undercontribute if a pension has more assets and if states have poor fiscal health, as measured by debt-to-GSP. Sponsors are also more likely to undercontribute if they use the projected unit credit actuarial method instead of the more widely used entry-age method.
The projected unit credit method has growing contributions over time, allowing some postponement of contributions relative to the entry-age actuarial method, which requires constant contributions.
Measuring Fiscal Stress with Unexpected Deficits
To measure the impact of fiscal stress on pension contribution ratios, I calculate unexpected deficit shocks following James Poterba (1994) . Unexpected deficit shocks measure the estimated gap between forecasted and actual budgets when adjusting for within-fiscal-year tax and spending changes. Let DeficitShock it be the per capita unexpected deficit (surplus) for state i in year t, where positive deficit shocks are deficits and negative shocks are surpluses.
DeficitShock is calculated by subtracting RevenueShock from ExpenditureShock. In years of fiscal stress, positive expenditure shocks and negative revenue shocks both contribute to positive deficit shocks. 
Estimating Undercontributions Caused By Unexpected Deficits
Unexpected deficits cause states to undercontribute and unexpected surpluses do not seem to affect state pension contributions. Regressing state contribution ratios on unexpected deficits between 1992 and 2007 results in a coefficient on unexpected deficit that is negative and significant while the coefficient on unexpected surplus is close to zero. Results are shown in Table 2 , where Alaska and Massachusetts are dropped because of outlier unexpected deficits. A number of controls are used. Lagged end-of-year balance controls for higher contributions due to leftover funds from the previous fiscal year, and the fraction of workers in a state that are public employees controls for possible pressure to fund pensions with state tax dollars.
We can interpret the regression coefficients by converting them into dollars of undercontributions per $100 of per capita unexpected deficit. Given a U.S. average contribution ratio of 89 percent and state contribution of $87 per capita across all years of this sample, a one percentage point decrease in the contribution ratio implies undercontributions of about $1 per capita. So the coefficient of -0.060 for all states implies pension undercontributions of $6 per $100 of per capita unexpected deficit. This is eight times the expected contribution cut of $0.73 per $100 of unexpected deficit. 10 Also, the coefficients for unexpected surplus are near zero and insignificant, suggesting that unexpected surpluses do not lead to overcontributions to pensions.
Expected revenues and expenditures may be distorted by state budget officers. For example,
Richard Boylan (2008) shows that budget forecasts are biased upward near elections. I estimate the model with instrumental variables to address this concern. Instrumental variables for deficit shocks are estimated with time-series models for state spending and revenues using lagged spending and lagged expenditures, similar to Poterba (1994) . Table 2 shows that the instrumental variable model gives similar results. States with annual legislatures may undercontribute more in reaction to unexpected deficits because they have more frequent opportunities to respond. Meanwhile, statutory constraints may not allow states to contribute the amount recommended by their plans' actuaries, at least until the statute is changed. Munnell et al. (2008) show that two-thirds of pension plans not making their ARC in 2006 were statutorily constrained-but as 2006 was a year of large unexpected surpluses, these states seem to have persistent undercontributions. While unconstrained states may make their ARC in expansionary years, they may use their flexibility to undercontribute more in recessionary years.
To test this, I divide annual states into those statutorily constrained and unconstrained.
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Compared with the entire sample, Table 4 shows that annual states should not be analyzed as one group, but that statutorily constrained and unconstrained states behave differently. States with annual legislatures and statutorily unconstrained contributions tend to undercontribute more in response to unexpected deficits, suggesting that some state legislatures take advantage of their greater flexibility. Contribution ratios for constrained states seem driven by other factors. The coefficient for the lagged funding ratio of 0.70 means that states with well-funded pensions tend to meet their ARC better than states with less well-funded pensions, suggesting a persistence of contributing behavior. It also appears that tax limits decrease state governments' ability to pay required pension contributions when they are statutorily constrained. 
Estimating Undercontributions with an Alternative Measure of Fiscal Stress
Unexpected deficits depend on state budget forecasts, which as mentioned previously may be biased. Alternatively, Russell Sobel and Randall Holcombe (1996) and Dean Stansel and David Mitchell (2008) define fiscal stress as the sum of below trend general fund spending and discretionary tax increases during downturns. I focus on how dampened tax revenues affect pension contributions by estimating trend tax shocks as in equation 2, but with quadratic-year actual revenue trend residuals minus within-fiscal-year tax changes. Downturn years are dropped from the revenue trend regressions, i.e., 1991, 1992, 2002, 2003, and 2009 .
The results of regressions using this alternative measure of fiscal stress suggest similar effects on pension contributions. Positive trend tax shocks cause undercontributions ten times other spending cuts. Following the same procedure shown in Munnell et al. 2010b, p. 9 ).
There is a positive correlation between state contributions and lagged end-of-year balances for annual and unconstrained states, but it only suggests a cumulative positive effect of $4 billion, a sixth of the negative effect of unexpected deficits. As expected, contributions from constrained states are not correlated with balances.
Conclusion
Fiscal stress pressures legislators to either raise taxes or cut spending, but state pensions provide a vehicle to postpone tax increases and maintain current spending. This process works like a rainy day fund in reverse-instead of first accumulating reserves to deal with fiscal stress, state governments "go in the red" by undercontributing to pensions and presumably make up the difference in the future.
Public pension underfunding results from many factors. This study shows that over the past two decades state undercontributions due to unexpected deficits explain only six percent of unfunded liabilities as of mid-2008, and state undercontributions for other reasons explain another third.
Meanwhile, investment returns have actually been in excess of assumed returns. Thus the primary source of pension underfunding was an increase in liabilities-which roughly doubled over this period-that was not matched by sufficient employee or required government contributions.
The fraction of state spending going to underfunded pensions and unfunded health care promises will grow in the future. Addressing underfunding today could help reduce pressure on tomorrow's state budgets. Munnell et al. (2010b, p. 1) argue that -each generation of taxpayers should pay the full cost of the public services it receives. If a worker's compensation includes a defined benefit pension, the cost of the benefit earned in that year should be recognized, and funded, at the time the worker performs that service, not when the pension is paid in retirement.‖ They believe that disciplining governments to pay required contributions could discourage them from promising excessive pension benefits in place of current wages-limiting the transfer of fiscal burdens to future taxpayers.
Ensuring that states meet their required contributions can help, but as pension underfunding seems largely due to increasing benefits, effective contribution reform could also force governments to more quickly fund new promises. For example, states could require increased pension benefits to be fully funded with a combination of employee and government contributions over a period of only a few years. This would compel current taxpayers to fund new pension promises rather than shifting the burden to future taxpayers.
